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The Joint Defense Privilege:
Know the Risks
by Gerald F. Uelmen
One of the biggest frustrations of being a litigator is that
decent, honest virtues-friendship and cooperativeness, for
example-can get you in trouble.
Suppose your client has been charged in a federal indict-
ment with conspiring to bribe a public official. You get a
telephone call from the lawyer representing a codefendant,
James Turner. She invites you to bring your client to a
meeting in her office.
Unlike most meetings, this one is a festival of good spirit
and time well spent. You get to interview Turner at length.
Returning the favor, you let Turner's lawyer interview your
client. You give Turner's lawyer copies of memoranda, rec-
ords of some witness interviews, and an outline of your
research on tactical options. You receive similar material
from Turner's lawyer. You also jointly hire an expert to
analyze numerous government tape recordings of wiretaps
and bugs.
Two weeks later, you get another call from Turner's law-
yer, and your good spirits begin to bum away like the morn-
ing mist. Turner has accepted an offer he could not refuse.
He has flipped. Done a deal with the prosecutor. And, by the
way, he will be the chief witness against your client at the
upcoming trial.
You Ask Questions
Things had been going so well that you absently mumble
"thank you" when you hang up. Then, your steel-trap mind
snaps into action. You become increasingly uneasy and, like
any good lawyer, you begin to ask questions:
- Can you stop Turner from revealing your client's state-
ments, either in his trial testimony or in pretrial meetings
with the prosecutor?
- Can you stop the prosecutor from using your memo-
randa of witness interviews?
- Can you preserve the confidentiality of your consulta-
tion with the tape-analysis expert?
- Can you use Turner's statements to cross-examine him
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or use his lawyer's memoranda to develop additional
evidence to discredit him?
- If the answer to many, or any, of these questions is
"No," should you contact your malpractice carrier and
start looking for another line of work?
Like most lawyers with doubts about their arguments or
conduct, you hope that a little research will improve your
outlook. Surely, in that vast and ever-growing mountain of
words, somebody must have said something that will help.
What looks now like a major blunder can be retroactively
repaired by a comforting pat on the head by some judge or
professor.
After less study than you feared, you discover the soothing
words you wanted. Something called the "joint defense
privilege" looks like it can change you from a credulous big
mouth into a crack litigator who knew all along there was
nothing to fear.
Joint defense privilege cases show that you are not alone.
Amiable lawyers have been stumbling into this fix for years.
More than 100 years ago, for example, in Chahoon v. Com-
monwealth, 62 Va. 822 (1872), three defendants, under in-
dictment for conspiracy to defraud, held a joint defense
strategy meeting with their individual lawyers. Later, one of
the three pled guilty.
At trial the prosecution called the attorney for the defen-
dant who pled guilty and asked him to testify about what one
of the remaining defendants said at the joint meeting. This is
a worse fix than you ever imagined. You are pleased to learn
that the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a claim of attorney-
client privilege, concluding that the testimony was properly
excluded at the trial.
Citing an 1872 decision, however, is not a sure-fire pre-
scription for success. You are, therefore, pleased to discover
after further research that the joint defense privilege did not
flare up more than 100 years ago only to sputter out shortly
thereafter.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit also recognized the joint
defense doctrine. Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330
F.2d 347 (9th Cir. -1964), involved a grand jury investigation
of two oil companies. Attorneys for both targets interviewed
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company employees summoned to testify, both before and
after their grand jury appearances. The lawyers exchanged
memoranda summarizing the interviews. The government
then subpoenaed both companies and their attorneys to pro-
duce the memoranda.
Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the subpoenas violated the attorney-client privilege. It
found that the interviewing attorneys were functioning as
attorneys for the witnesses as well as for the company, and
relied on Chahoon for the proposition that the exchange of
material did not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege.
Having found Chahoon and Continental Oil, you begin to
relax. The joint defense privilege is a venerable, but still vital
doctrine. You were right all along.
But soon you have new doubts. Privileges are fragile,
tricky things, easily waived and subject to many qualifica-
tions. What is the scope of the joint defense privilege? What
are its requirements? Who can exercise or waive it? And,
will it protect your client against Turner's proposed testi-
mony?
Back to the books. You quickly learn that life is never
simple. Different jurisdictions have developed different
rules regarding the application and scope of the joint defense
privilege. What is more, the law has developed in the crimi-
nal area, and its application to the civil side is mostly by
analogy.
You begin to wish that you had done this research before
meeting with Turner and his lawyer. You would be sleeping
better now if you had known this and had clearly spelled out
the terms of your cooperative exchange before it began.
Here are some examples of what you should have thought
about. First, the purpose of the joint activity. Some courts
strictly insist that the purpose of a joint conference or ex-
change of privileged information be the pursuit of a mutual,
"common" interest. If one party just wants to extract infor-
mation from another, there can be real trouble.
In Vance v. State, 190 Tenn. 521, 230 S.W. 2d 987, cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 988 (1950), for example, the defendant
made certain statements at a joint conference where a code-
fendant and both attorneys were present. The court held that
such statements were not privileged, since the conference
was simply for the benefit of the first defendant, and the
codefendant was not collaborating in a joint defense.
This means that a wholesale distribution of privileged
material among all defendants and their lawyers in some
state proceedings can be extremely dangerous. Distribution
should be limited to those who are actively involved in
discussion of strategy.
The Scope of the Privilege
Fortunately for you and your client's problems with
Turner, federal courts are not as strict as the Vance court.
They have extended the privilege to virtually any exchange
of information among clients and lawyers on the same side
of a case. See, for example, Hunydee v. United States, 355
F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965).
Despite the federal approach, attorneys contemplating
joint defense meetings in any proceeding must carefully
evaluate the relative positions of various defendants. This is
especially true when an exchange of privileged information
is proposed. Some defendants are more likely candidates for
plea bargains than others. Their reasons for participating
may be different from yours. You need to be skeptical about
who they may talk to and how much joint information they
will pass along.
The inherent unreliability of criminal codefendants means
that, before any joint exchange, everyone must agree, as a
condition of the exchange, that all overtures by the prosecu-
tor will be promptly disclosed to cooperating co-counsel. In
addition, be sure to ask co-counsel if any plea discussions
have already taken place and what the prospects are for such
discussions in the future. The news that a codefendant has
"turned" should rarely be a total surprise.
With more research, you learn more details. Apart from the
purpose of the exchange and the motives-present or fu-
ture-of your coparticipants, the timing of a meeting or
exchange can be critical. The key question is whether pro-
tected joint defense efforts can occur before the actual insti-
tution of litigation. In Continental Oil, for example, the court
rejected an attempt to limit Chahoon to postindictment ex-
changes of information. It held the privilege applied even
though the clients were not yet codefendants when the ex-
change occurred. The court essentially extended the joint
defense privilege to any situation where joint consultation
would be mutually beneficial.
There was a time when it seemed the Federal Rules of
Evidence would adopt Continental Oil. As recommended by
the Supreme Court, Rule 503(b) extended the lawyer-client
privilege to communications "made for the purpose of facili-
tating the rendition of professional legal services to the client
... by him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a
matter of common interest ......
Congress, however, eliminated all of the rules relating to
privilege from the final version of the rules adopted in 1974.
Nevertheless, the proposed rule, though discarded, has had a
broad impact. Its text was adopted in Alaska, Florida, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
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Weinstein's Evidence, § 503(03). Federal courts also have
cited the proposed rule in determining the scope of the joint
defense privilege. See, for example, United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336-37 (7th Cir. 1979). But see
United States v. Lopez, 777 F. 2d 543 (10th Cir. 1985).
Such a broad construction of the joint defense privilege-
extending it to cases involving actual or even contemplated
litigation-is not uniform. Many jurisdictions do not go so
far. For example, although the Uniform Rules of Evidence
largely mirror the Federal Rules, Uniform Rule 502, which
defines the lawyer-client privilege, does not. Section (b)(3)
of that rule limits the privilege to communications:
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client ... by him or
his representative or his lawyer or a representative of
the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer
representing another party in a pending action and
concerning a matter of common interest therein.
(Emphasis added.)
This rule has been adopted in the evidence codes of Arkan-
sas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, North Dakota, South Dakota,
and Oklahoma. Weinstein's Evidence, § 503(03). As a result,
especially before an indictment or a lawsuit is filed, you
must know what the local law is before you engage in joint
defense efforts.
But even in a liberal, "prelawsuit privilege" jurisdiction,
you must be careful. Where preindictment and precomplaint
exchanges of privileged information are proposed, you
should often just say no. The risk is great that privileged
information will be leaked in the ordinary course of an
investigation.
An even bigger problem looms. You could find yourself
the target of a disqualification motion. When your client and
the newly-flipped prosecution witness were codefendants,
you may have received privileged communications or mate-
rials from the former defendant. The prosecution might ar-
gue successfully that you cannot stand in an adversarial
relationship with a witness who has provided you with privi-
leged information in confidence.
The risk of disqualification is not unique to criminal mat-
ters. It is present in civil cases, where cooperative exchanges
are proposed before litigation has begun. Just as joint repre-
sentation of parties prior to litigation may preclude represen-
tation of either party in a later trial, the exchange of privi-
leged information between counsel for parties whose inter-
ests later conflict may later disqualify both counsel. See
Taskier and Casper, Vicarious Disqualification of Co-Coun-
sel Because of "Taint," 1 Geo. J. L. Ethic 155 (1987). So be-
ware, even if there is a joint defense privilege before litiga-
tion.
By now, your research has given you some comfort. You
can probably prevent Turner from testifying about your joint
discussions. But what about the bigger risk? Can you stop
Turner from feeding the prosecution privileged information
before trial? That is much harder to do.
Virtually every reported case discussing the joint defense
privilege has addressed only the admission of privileged
information as evidence at trial. One of the few cases to
discuss pretrial breach of the joint defense privilege shows
how hard it is to stop. In United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d
641 (5th Cir. 1981), a codefendant participated in joint meet-
ings with the defendants and lawyers after he agreed to
cooperate and become an informant for the government. He
delivered privileged information to the prosecution. He re-
corded strategy sessions among defense attorneys and their
clients. The district court found a violation of the Sixth
Amendment and dismissed the indictment.
The court of appeals reversed. It held that the defendants
were not entitled to any remedy absent a showing of "preju-
dice." The court also said that even if prejudice were shown,
the trial judge should tailor a remedy short of dismissal, such
as suppression of the evidence obtained by breach of the
privilege.
Unfortunately, suppression is a poor remedy. It imposes no
penalty and affords no relief for harm done by pretrial breach
of the privilege. Even for what it is worth, suppression is a
feeble option, because it is full of procedural obstacles and
pitfalls. You cannot be sure that you will be able to show that
particular information was secured through breach of a privi-
lege and not some other, nonprivileged source.
Such limited judicial protection means that attorneys must
be creative in looking for ways to prevent, limit, or highlight
breach of the joint defense privilege. If you want to be
protected, you need to do your homework before you get to
court. If a codefendant turns and becomes a government
witness, it is important to flag the issue immediately. Seek a
court order impounding any privileged material in the pos-
session of the codefendant or his attorney. Consider quick
action to define the extent of the taint caused by the breach.
One possibility is to seek a hearing on how any privileged
information was, or may be, used in any subsequent proceed-
ing. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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Finally, you should consider moving to disqualify oppos-
ing counsel if he or she has obtained really sensitive infor-
mation from your client. Before you do this, however, re-
member that disqualification can be a two-way street.
Because you may have privileged information from your
former confederate and new adversary, you also may be
subject to disqualification.
There is another protective device, suggested not long ago
by Steven Wilson, now a federal judge in Los Angeles. He
believes that no privileged material should be exchanged
until a written agreement has been executed. This would add
contract remedies to the resources that could be used to
protect privileged material. Judge Wilson suggests the agree-
ment should, at a minimum, have the following provisions:
1) the information transmitted contains confidential at-
torney-client communications that are privileged;
2) it is being transmitted only to counsel for other sub-
jects of the pending investigation;
3) the exchange is made to facilitate presentation of
common defenses...
4) that the document must not be furnished to any other
person by way of production of a copy or disclosure of
its contents; and
5) each of the parties agrees to voluntarily waive any
civil actions that he (or it) may now or in the future be
able to prosecute against any or all of the signatories to
the agreement.
Wilson, Using the Joint Defense Privilege, Nat'l. L. J.,
March 4, 1983.
This kind of agreement can be very helpful, but you may
not be able to get it. Few lawyers would agree to a broad
waiver of "any civil actions" against other signatories. Ulti-
mately, how much you seek in a written agreement depends
on how much you trust or mistrust your prospective allies.
What about work product? Can you stop Turner from
turning over your witness interview memoranda? The joint
defense privilege explicitly protects only client confidences.
It does not extend to interviews of nonparty witnesses,
memoranda discussing tactics and strategy, legal research, or
other similar information. Such material is protected by a
limited work product privilege in the hands of the lawyer
who produced it, but there is a serious question whether that
protection is waived if the material is shared with another
party's lawyer.
If logic prevails, you should be safe. There is no more
reason to find a waiver of the work product privilege in the
sharing of such materials with co-counsel than there is with
the sharing of lawyer-client confidences protected by the
joint defense privilege. This is especially true for consulta-
tion with experts, particularly when counsel has not yet
decided whether to call the expert as a witness.
Aside from general considerations of confidentiality, pub-
lic policy should encourage litigants to share the expense of
consulting experts. This would help ensure wider availability
of an often small pool of experts and would help reduce the
cost of litigation. It also might reduce the number of wit-
nesses who have to testify.
Despite the logical force of these observations, there are
few cases on either side of the issue. You just cannot be sure.
This, and basic prudence, means that a written agreement,
once again, is essential. The agreement should spell out not
only how the expenses for joint expert consultation will be
shared, but also how access to the information will be pro-
tected, even if one party to the joint consultation later drops
out. This should be clearly explained to the expert as well.
Thinking about this kind of agreement is critical. The ab-
sence of precedent means it may be the only protection you
have.
By now, you are getting discouraged. You probably should
have had a joint defense agreement before dealing with
Turner, but you did not. You should at least have thought
about the situation, but you didn't do much of that either.
What can you do to strike back? Can you cross-examine
Turner with something he said during joint defense consulta-
tion? If he can breach the privilege you thought existed, why
can't you?
Here again, the cases offer a little guidance. What you have
in mind would be precluded if you had represented your
client and Turner jointly. An attorney who previously repre-
sented someone cannot use information obtained in that
representation to discredit his former client. Under such
circumstances, the attorney might even be precluded from
representing the remaining client due to conflict of interest.
Rule 1.9, A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct; Cf.
People v. Lepe, 211 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1985); Dill v. Superior
Court, 205 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
One of the few cases to extend this concept to a joint
defense arrangement is State v. Maxwell, 691 P.2d 1316
(Kan. Ct. App. 1984). There, a single lawyer had three
clients, including the eventual defendant and two key wit-
nesses against hiia. By the time of trial, the lawyer was not
representing any defendant, and the new defense counsel
called the former lawyer to impeach the testimony of his past
clients with prior inconsistencies.
The Kansas Court of Appeals said no. Besides pointing to
Before you move to disqualify
counsel, remember that
disqualification can be a
two-way street.
basic attorney-client privilege, it relied broadly on the joint
defense privilege. It suggested that the result would have
been the same even if the statement had been shared among
co-counsel for separately represented clients:
The assurance of confidentiality is as important and
appropriate in a joint defense of defendants whose
attorneys are separately retained as it is where co-
defendants have engaged common counsel.
691 P.2d at 1321.
Thus, the court implied that the attorney could be pre-
cluded from testifying and presumably from cross-examin-
ing the witness about information received in a joint defense
cooperative effort.
Barring use of privileged statements for impeachment is a
proper solution. The joint defense privilege should give the
same protection as the attorney-client privilege. A person
who has relied on the joint confidence of a group of attorneys
(please turn to page 60)
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Judge Medina's mind was not suffi-
cient to disqualify. In those days, dis-
qualifying bias in federal court required
a personal bias involving a party, rather
than a closed mind regarding a statute
or an economic theory that "might rea-
sonably be questioned." See 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 at 263. In charging bias, we al-
lowed our pique, not to say outrage, to
dominate our tactics. It also should be
said that the government's case on con-
spiracy, while by no means totally
without support, was weak.
Two final points. First, my friends at
the corporate bar tell me that the invest-
ment banking business has completely
changed since the trial 35 years ago and
that it is now far more competitive.
Second, if I have given you the impres-
sion that the judge was an ogre, I have
failed grievously. He was charming
much of the time and delightful some
of the time. He was extremely intelli-
gent and learned in the law. Indeed, I
learned a great deal about trial conduct
from him.
I conclude by revealing that Judge
Medina still lives. Indeed, he is 100
years old.
So ends the story of a remarkable
judge and a remarkable trial. L
Joint
Defense
(continued from page 38)
should not have his privileged state-
ments used against him by former co-
counsel simply because he testifies for
the other side. A contrary rule would
strongly discourage the sharing of in-
formation, lessen joint defense efforts,
and make codefendants even more skit-
tish than they already are.
Disqualifying an attorney because of
his access to joint defense information,
however, is a drastic remedy and
presents significant problems. The
prosecution could eliminate a whole
squadron of lawyers simply by turning
one codefendant. (In the context of
civil cases, it has been suggested that
the strong incentive of co-counsel
aligned against a common opponent to
share privileged information should
give rise to a rebuttable presumption of
co-counsel taint. Thus, if one lawyer is
disqualified, co-counsel could be
disqualified to the same extent as if
they were members of the same firm.
Taskier and Casper, Vicarious
Disqualification of Co-Counsel
Because of "Taint," I Geo. J. L. Ethic
155 (1987).
Though disqualification is problem-
atical, it can happen. Not all courts will
stop with barring impeachment using
confidential statements. This again
highlights the need for a written joint
defense agreement. Such an agreement
should specify what information will
be shared and should define how it can
be used. This can be crucially impor-
tant if counsel disqualification be-
comes an issue. Again, the cautious
lawyer might well shy away from joint
defense participation if disqualification
were likely.
In the end, parties on different sides
of a joint defense relationship have an
apparent but illusory symmetry: You
likely can prevent Turner from testify-
ing to privileged statements; he likely
can stop you from using such state-
ments to impeach. In extreme cases,
you may be able to disqualify his law-
yer, and she may be able to disqualify
you.
Such apparently equal treatment is,
however, misleading. Though in theory
former codefendants may be able to
prevent one another from breaching a
former joint defense privilege even be-
fore trial, that is a hard right to enforce.
You simply cannot monitor Turner
every minute. You may not be able to
show that any given piece of prosecu-
tion knowledge came from a breach by
Turner.
More than that-and here is where
the symmetry really fails-only Turner
has a motive to breach the privilege be-
fore trial. You have no reason to hurt
him through pretrial revelation of his
privileged statements. Put it this way:
The core, inherent problem with joint
defense arrangements is that the hard-
est breach to police is the one that rene-
gade codefendants alone have a reason
to commit.
All this means that, although a joint
defense privilege has achieved general
recognition-especially in the federal
courts-there are plenty of unanswered
questions. Great caution is essential in
the sharing of privileged information.
Always consider the possibility in
criminal cases that some prospective
defendants may decide to cooperate
with the government. An attorney in
such a situation might do well to ap-
proach joint defense efforts as he
would the negotiation of an arms con-
trol agreement. Recognize the potential
benefits of cooperation, and try to
achieve them, but be wary. Realize that
each codefendant has his own agenda
and motives. Everyone is holding
something back. Everyone is in it for
himself.
To implement this approach, rely on
little unless it is in writing. Insist on a
written agreement, be sure everyone
understands it, and police it. Mark
privileged material clearly and, at
meetings, state your reliance on the
privilege. Act quickly to control the
damage if a codefendant flips.
None of this is fun. None of it is easy.
None of it will win you friends. But
remember how you felt when Turner's
lawyer called to announce her client's
transformation. Caution and suspicion
are far better than that sinking, sour
feeling of being played for a fool. L
Bad Faith
(continued from page 42)
the starting gate on an all-too-familiar
technicality.
Keep detailed time records, even if
you are in contingency. Some jurisdic-
tions treat bad faith claims as an excep-
tion to the American Rule and permit
Insured to recover his attorneys' fees.
Generally, courts limit the award to
fees expended in pursuit of the benefits
promised in the insurance contract; fees
spent to obtain punitive or other extra-
contractual damages are not included.
Time sheets should reflect this distinc-
tion. You also may want to tailor your
fee arrangement accordingly, billing
the benefits portion of your work on an
hourly basis while keeping the extra-
contractual aspect on contingency.
Even as you are reciting Insured's
injuries to the jury, the focus should
remain on Carrier, its conduct, and its
method of doing business. Especially if
Insured's out-of-pocket loss is small,
you will need to persuade the jury to
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